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Visual aids can improve comprehension of risks associated with medical treatments,
screenings, and lifestyles. Do visual aids also help decision makers accurately assess
their risk comprehension? That is, do visual aids help them become well calibrated? To
address these questions, we investigated the benefits of visual aids displaying numerical
information and measured accuracy of self-assessment of diagnostic inferences (i.e.,
metacognitive judgment calibration) controlling for individual differences in numeracy.
Participants included 108 patients who made diagnostic inferences about three medical
tests on the basis of information about the sensitivity and false-positive rate of
the tests and disease prevalence. Half of the patients received the information in
numbers without a visual aid, while the other half received numbers along with
a grid representing the numerical information. In the numerical condition, many
patients–especially those with low numeracy–misinterpreted the predictive value of the
tests and profoundly overestimated the accuracy of their inferences. Metacognitive
judgment calibration mediated the relationship between numeracy and accuracy
of diagnostic inferences. In contrast, in the visual aid condition, patients at all
levels of numeracy showed high-levels of inferential accuracy and metacognitive
judgment calibration. Results indicate that accurate metacognitive assessment may
explain the beneficial effects of visual aids and numeracy–a result that accords
with theory suggesting that metacognition is an essential part of risk literacy. We
conclude that well-designed risk communications can inform patients about health-
relevant numerical information while helping them assess the quality of their own risk
comprehension.
Keywords: visual aids, Bayesian reasoning, natural frequencies, numeracy, risk literacy, medical decision making,
diagnostic inferences
Introduction
Visual aids are graphical representations of numerical expressions of probability. They include,
among others, icon arrays, bar and line charts, and grids (Paling, 2003; Spiegelhalter et al., 2011).
Visual aids provide an effective means of risk communication when they are transparent (Garcia-
Retamero and Cokely, 2013)—that is, when their elements are well defined and they accurately and
clearly represent the relevant risk information by making part-to-whole relationships in the data
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visually available (Gillan et al., 1998; Ancker et al., 2006; Reyna
and Brainerd, 2008; Fischhoff et al., 2012; Trevena et al., 2012).
Transparent visual aids improve comprehension of risks
associated with different lifestyles, screenings, and medical
treatments, and they promote consideration of beneficial
treatments despite side-effects (Feldman-Stewart et al., 2000;
Paling, 2003; Waters et al., 2007; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008a;
Zikmund-Fisher, 2015). Transparent visual aids also increase
appropriate risk-avoidance behaviors, they promote healthy
behaviors (Garcia-Retamero and Cokely, 2011, 2014a), they
reduce errors and biases induced by anecdotal narratives and
framed messages (Fagerlin et al., 2005; Schirillo and Stone, 2005;
Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2009, 2010a; Cox et al., 2010;
Garcia-Retamero et al., 2010) and they aid comprehension of
complex concepts such as incremental risk (Zikmund-Fisher
et al., 2008b). Risk information presented visually is also judged
as easier to understand and recall than the same information
presented numerically (Feldman-Stewart et al., 2007; Goodyear-
Smith et al., 2008; Gaissmaier et al., 2012; Zikmund-Fisher et al.,
2014; Okan et al., 2015).
However, not all visual aids are equally effective for all tasks (see
Garcia-Retamero and Cokely, 2013, for a review). For instance,
bar graphs are useful for comparing data points (Lipkus and
Hollands, 1999; Lipkus, 2007; Fischhoff et al., 2012); line graphs
are helpful for depicting trends over time; magnifier risk scales
(including magnifying lenses) are useful for depicting small
numbers (Ancker et al., 2006); icon arrays can be helpful for
communicating treatment risk reduction and risk of side effects
(Feldman-Stewart et al., 2000;Garcia-Retamero andGalesic, 2009,
2010b; Ancker et al., 2011; Okan et al., 2012); logic trees can be
useful for visually depicting argument structure (Mandel, 2014);
and grids can help depict large numbers when communicating the
predictive value of medical tests (Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage,
2013).
Grids displaying numerical information graphically have been
found to boost the accuracy of perceptions of health-related
benefits and risks beyond the effect of other transparent
information formats. To illustrate, doctors and patients often
have difficulties inferring the predictive value of a medical test
from information about the sensitivity and false-positive rate
of the test and the prevalence of the disease. In an influential
study on how doctors process information about the results
of mammography, Eddy (1982) gave 100 doctors the following
information: “The probability that a woman has breast cancer
is 1%. When a woman has breast cancer, it is not sure that she
will have a positive result on the mammography: she has an 80%
probability of having a positive result on the mammography.
When a woman does not have breast cancer, it is still possible
that she will have a positive result on the mammography:
she has a 10% probability of having a positive result on the
mammography.”
After having read this information, doctors were required
to estimate the probability that a woman with a positive
mammography actually has breast cancer. Eddy (1982) reported
that 95 of 100 doctors estimated this probability to be about
80% (see Gigerenzer, 2013; Ellis et al., 2014, for similar results in
patients). If one inserts the numbers presented above into a Bayes’
theorem, however, one gets a value of 8%, which is one order of
magnitude smaller.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995, 1999) showed that
communicating information about medical tests in natural
frequencies as compared to probabilities improves diagnostic
inferences (see also Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001;
Kurzenhäuser and Hoffrage, 2002; Mandel, 2015). Natural
frequencies are final tallies in a set of objects or events randomly
sampled from the natural environment (Hoffrage et al., 2000,
2002). For the mammography task the statistical information
provided in terms of natural frequencies reads: “100 out of every
10,000 women have breast cancer. When a woman has breast
cancer, it is not sure that she will have a positive result on the
mammography: 80 of every 100 such women will have a positive
result on the mammography. When a woman does not have
breast cancer, it is still possible that she will have a positive result
on the mammography: 990 out of every 9,900 such women will
have a positive result on the mammography.”
Even though the effect of numerical format (probabilities vs.
natural frequencies) is substantial, performance in the natural
frequency condition still leaves room for improvement. A study
conducted by Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage (2013) showed that
grids displaying numerical information graphically improved
diagnostic inferences in both doctors and their patients beyond
the effect of natural frequencies (see also Brase, 2014, for
similar results in young adults). The authors showed that these
grids not only increased objective accuracy but also increased
perceived usefulness of information and decreased perceived
task difficulty. The aim of the current research was to extend
this literature by investigating whether visual aids also help
decision makers accurately assess their risk comprehension
(metacognitive judgment calibration). In particular, we followed
the method used by Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage (2013) and
investigated whether grids graphically displaying information
about the predictive value ofmedical tests improve self-assessment
of diagnostic inferences in patients.
Previous research showed that people can be highly
overconfident when assessing the accuracy of their own
judgments (Griffin and Brenner, 2004). For example, Dunning
et al. (2004) conducted a systematic review of the literature
on the topic and concluded that people’s self-views hold only
a tenuous to modest relationship with their actual behavior
and performance. On average, people say that they are “above
average” in skill—a conclusion that defies statistical possibility for
symmetric distributions of individuals (however, this conclusion
is plausible if the mean and the median of a distribution are
not identical; Gigerenzer et al., 2012). People also overestimate
the likelihood that they will engage in desirable behaviors and
achieve favorable outcomes, they furnish overly optimistic
estimates of when they will complete future projects, and they
reach judgments with too much confidence.
People tend to be highly overconfident at low levels of accuracy
yet relatively well calibrated at higher levels of accuracy—a result
that suggests the presence of an “unskilled and unaware effect”
(Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008). This result
is consistent with research on individuals with low numeracy (i.e.,
the ability to accurately interpret numerical information about
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risk; Ancker and Kaufman, 2007; Fagerlin et al., 2007; Reyna
et al., 2009; Galesic and Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Cokely et al.,
2012; Peters, 2012). This research shows that people with low
numeracy are especially inaccurate when evaluating the accuracy
of their own judgments, showing overconfidence (Ghazal et al.,
2014), and are not able to use risk reduction information to
adjust their estimates (Schwartz et al., 1997). Overconfidence
mediates, at least in part, the effect of numeracy on judgment
accuracy (Ghazal et al., 2014). Thus, people with low numeracy
may struggle to grasp numerical concepts that are essential for
understanding health-relevant information because they have
difficulties assessing the accuracy of their own estimates.
Our hypothesis is that visual aids can improve both accuracy
of diagnostic inferences and metacognitive judgment calibration
(i.e., how well patients assess the accuracy of these inferences)
(H1). We also hypothesize that visual aids may be especially useful
for patients with low numeracy (H2). Visual aids can increase the
likelihood that less numerate patients deliberate on the available
risk information, elaborating more on the problem at hand and
on their own understanding of the problem (Garcia-Retamero
and Cokely, 2013, 2014b). Deliberation tends to be important for
risk understanding because it promotes more thorough, complex,
and durable information representations (Cokely and Kelley,
2009)—an important component of metacognitive judgment
calibration (Thompson et al., 2011). By influencing encoding
and representation, visual aids can increase metacognitive
judgment calibration, reducing overconfidence. Improvements in
metacognitive processes can, in turn, improve the accuracy of
inferences (H3).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants included 108 patients recruited from four hospitals
in the cities of Jaén and Granada (Spain) during treatment
consultation. To be eligible for recruitment, patients had to have
no previous formal medical training. If they agreed to participate,
they were provided with an introductory letter describing the
purpose of the study and their questions were answered. Eighty
four percent of the patients who had been approached (n = 128)
agreed to participate in the study. Those who refused mentioned
one or more of the following reasons: respondent burden, lack
of interest in research, and/or busy schedules. Patients had an
average age of 52 years (range 19–76), and 78%were females.Most
of the patients (86%) had a high school degree or less, and only
14% had a university education before participating in the study.
Twenty-three percent of the patients had a chronic condition (e.g.,
allergies or diabetes). Patients received €20 for participating in
the study and were assigned randomly to one of two groups.
Male and female patients were evenly distributed in the groups.
The Ethics Committee of the University of Granada approved the
methodology, and all patients consented to participation through
a consent form at the beginning of the study.
Materials and Procedure
Patients completed a two-part paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
In the first part, they were presented with three tasks involving
TABLE 1 | Information about prevalence of the diseases, and sensitivity
and false-positive rate of the tests.
Diagnostic Base rate Sensitivity False- Positive
task positive predictive
rate value
Breast cancer 100 of 10,000 80 of 100 990 of 9,900 80 of 1,070
Colon cancer 30 of 10,000 15 of 30 299 of 9,970 15 of 314
Diabetes 50 of 10,000 48 of 50 4,975 of 9,950 48 of 5,023
Note that the false-positive rate is the complement of the specificity.
different diagnostic inferences: inferring breast cancer from a
positive mammogram, colon cancer from a positive hemoccult
test, and insulin-dependent diabetes from a genetic test. The order
of the three tasks was randomized, independently for each patient.
Wording and length of the tasks were comparable to the variant
of the breast cancer task that we provided in the introduction
of the current article. The information about the sensitivity and
false-positive rate of the tests and prevalence of the diseases was
taken from published studies (Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998;
Garcia-Retamero andHoffrage, 2013) andwas reported in natural
frequencies (see Table 1). There were no time constraints, but the
questionnaire took approximately 15 min to complete.
Half of the patients received the information about the
sensitivity and false-positive rate of the tests and prevalence of
the diseases in numbers without a visual aid. The other half
received numbers along with a grid representing the numerical
information. Figure 1 presents the grid that patients received
in the mammography task. The visual display represented the
number of women who obtained a positive mammogram, the
number of womenwho have breast cancer, and the overall number
of women at risk. Women were depicted as squares as previous
research has found no differences in effects of arrays with faces
compared to more abstract symbols such as squares or circles
(Stone et al., 2003; Gaissmaier et al., 2012).
After having received the information about the sensitivity and
false-positive rate of the test and the base rate of the disease for
a given task, patients made a diagnostic inference. In the breast
cancer task, patients were told: “Imagine a representative sample
of women who got a positive result on the mammography. Give
your best guess: how many of these women do you expect to
have breast cancer?” Patients were asked to provide two numbers
such as X out of Y (leaving it up to them which denominator
to use). After making the three diagnostic inferences, patients
estimated accuracy of their diagnostic inferences. In particular,
they estimated the number of correct inferences that they thought
they had made on a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The second part
of the questionnaire included a measure of numerical skills using
twelve items taken from Schwartz et al. (1997) and Lipkus et al.
(2001 ; see Cokely et al., 2012, for a review).
Design and Dependent Variables
We employed a mixed design with one independent variable
manipulated experimentally between-groups: information format
(numerical only vs. numerical and visual). In addition, we
considered one independent variable that was not manipulated
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FIGURE 1 | Visual aid representing the overall number of women at risk, the number of women who have breast cancer, and the number of women
who obtained a positive mammogram.
experimentally but measured, namely numeracy.We split patients
into two groups according to themedian of their numeracy scores.
The low-numeracy group (n= 52) included patients with eight or
fewer correct answers, while the high-numeracy group (n = 56)
included those with nine ormore correct answers (see Peters et al.,
2006; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2010b; and Garcia-Retamero
and Cokely, 2014a, for a similar procedure).
Patients answered questions about the three tasks involving
different diagnostic inferences. We used patients’ answers to the
questions to determine our three dependent variables. Objective
accuracy was measured as the percentage of correct inferences
in the three tasks. Following Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995; see
also Hoffrage et al., 2000), a response was considered accurate
if it matched the value specified in the last column of Table 1
plus/minus one percentage point. Amore liberal criterion than the
one that we used in our analyses yielded similar findings to those
reported in the results section. Estimated accuracy was measured
as the estimated percentage of correct inferences in the three
tasks. Finally, metacognitive judgment calibration was determined
for each patient by computing the difference between estimated
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accuracy and objective accuracy (see Ghazal et al., 2014, for a
similar method).
Analyses
First, we conducted analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to assess the
effect of information format and numeracy on objective accuracy,
estimated accuracy, and metacognitive judgment calibration
(H1 and H2). Second, we assessed whether metacognitive
judgment calibration explains the effect of information format
and numeracy on objective accuracy (H3). In particular, we
conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to assess the
effect of information format and numeracy on objective accuracy
after controlling for metacognitive judgment calibration. We also
conducted mediational analyses to assess whether the effect of
information format and numeracy on objective accuracy was
mediated by metacognitive judgment calibration.
Finally, to find additional support of our hypothesis (H3) and
address an alternative explanation of our results, we investigated
whether objective accuracy explains the effect of information
format and numeracy on metacognitive judgment calibration.
In particular, we conducted an ANCOVA to assess the effect of
information format and numeracy on metacognitive judgment
calibration after controlling for objective accuracy. In addition,
we conducted mediational analyses to assess whether the effect
of information format and numeracy on metacognitive judgment
calibration was mediated by objective accuracy. As this alternative
model seems plausible, we compared the size of its indirect effect
(i.e., the amount of mediation) with that of the model with
metacognitive judgment calibration as a mediator. Numeracy
was included as a dichotomous variable in the ANOVAs and
ANCOVAs and as a continuous variable in themediation analyses.
We found consistent results in these analyses (for a similar
method, see Peters et al., 2006; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic,
2009, 2010b; and Garcia-Retamero and Cokely, 2014a).
Results
Howdid patients perform in the diagnostic inference tasks? And how
did they think they had performed in the tasks? The percentage
of patients who answered correctly three, two, one, and zero
tasks was 24, 19, 18, and 39% respectively. In contrast, 50, 25,
19, and 6% of the patients estimated that they had made three,
two, one, and zero correct diagnostic inferences, respectively.
Only 34% of the patients were accurate when assessing the
accuracy of their inferences (i.e., they were well calibrated); 38%
overestimated accuracy in one task (33%); 18% overestimated
accuracy in two tasks (67%); 6% overestimated accuracy in three
tasks (100%); and 4% underestimated accuracy. Patients who
achieved higher levels of accuracy were well calibrated, whereas
patient with low levels of accuracy were highly overconfident (see
Figure 2).
Do visual aids and numeracy affect objective accuracy? Are
visual aids especially useful for patients with low numeracy?
Patients made more accurate inferences when the information
was presented both numerically and visually (55% correct
inferences) as compared to numerically only (32%) (H1). In
addition, patients with high numeracy were more accurate (51%
FIGURE 2 | Estimated accuracy by objective accuracy. Error bars
indicate one standard error of the mean.
correct inferences) as compared to low-numerate patients (35%).
Finally, grids displaying numerical information were particularly
useful additions for patients with low numeracy (see Figure 3).
In contrast, there was only a minor increase in accuracy in
patients with high numeracy when they received the additional
visual display (H2). In line with these results, the ANOVA
with information format and numeracy as between-subjects
factors and objective accuracy across the three tasks as the
dependent variable revealed a main effect of information format,
F1;104 = 10.77, p= 0.001, !2p = 0.09, and numeracy, F1;104 = 5.79,
p = 0.02, !2p = 0.05. The interaction between information format
and numeracy was also significant, F1;104 = 3.82, p = 0.05,
!2p = 0.04.
Do visual aids and numeracy affect estimated accuracy and
metacognitive judgment calibration? Are visual aids especially
useful for patients with low numeracy? Estimates of accuracy were
not influenced by information format or numeracy. On average,
patients estimated that 72% of their inferences were correct (see
Figure 3). In contrast, both information format and numeracy had
an effect on accuracy of estimates (i.e., metacognitive judgment
calibration) (H1). Grids displaying numerical information
improved metacognitive judgment calibration in patients with
low numeracy. These patients more accurately estimated the
accuracy of their own inferences when they received the visual
aid. However, the beneficial effect of the visual aid could not be
observed in patients with high numeracy (H2). These patients
were relatively well calibrated regardless of information format. In
line with these results, the ANOVA with information format and
numeracy as between-subjects factors and estimated accuracy
of diagnostic inferences across the three tasks as a dependent
variable did not reveal any significant results (F < 1). In contrast,
the ANOVA with information format and numeracy as between-
subjects factors and metacognitive judgment calibration as a
dependent variable revealed a main effect of information format,
F1;104 = 14.62, p= 0.001, !2p = 0.12, and numeracy, F1;104 = 5.28,
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FIGURE 3 | Objective accuracy, estimated accuracy, and metacognitive judgment calibration across the three diagnostic tasks by information format
and numeracy. Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.
p = 0.02, !2p = 0.05, and an interaction between information
format and numeracy, F1;104 = 10.22, p = 0.002, !2p = 0.09.
Does metacognitive judgment calibration explain the effect of
information format and numeracy on objective accuracy? Visual
aids do not improve objective accuracy in patients with low
numeracy when metacognitive judgment calibration has been
controlled for statistically (see Figure 4). In line with these results,
theANCOVAwith information format andnumeracy as between-
subjects factors, objective accuracy across the three tasks as the
dependent variable, and metacognitive judgment calibration as a
covariate only revealed a main effect of metacognitive judgment
calibration, F1;103 = 37.25, p = 0.001, !2p = 0.27. The main effect
of information format and numeracy and the interaction between
information format and numeracy was no longer significant
(F < 1).
To ensure comparability with results in the ANOVA and
ANCOVA, in mediational analyses we first modeled objective
accuracywhen patients received information in numbers and then
when they received an additional visual display representing the
numerical information. In the numerical condition, regression
analyses showed that numeracy influenced both metacognitive
judgment calibration, b =  0.56, t53 =  4.97, p = 0.001, and
objective accuracy, b = 0.46, t53 = 3.82, p = 0.001, whereby
patients who were more numerate more accurately assessed the
accuracy of their inferences (i.e., were better calibrated) and
made more accurate inferences (see Figure 5A). In addition,
metacognitive judgment calibration was related to objective
accuracy, b =  0.52, t52 =  4.04, p = 0.001. Patients who
more accurately assessed the accuracy of their inferences also
made more accurate inferences. When metacognitive judgment
calibration was included in the regression analyses, the effect of
numeracy onobjective accuracywas significantly reduced andwas
no longer significant, b= 0.17, t52 = 1.30, p= 0.20. The results of
the Sobel test indicated that metacognitive judgment calibration
mediates the relationship between numeracy and objective
accuracy, z = 3.135, p = 0.001 [Effect = 0.30, 95% CI (0.27,0.33);
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) = 998.80]. When patients
received the additional visual aid representing the numerical
information, numeracy did not influencemetacognitive judgment
calibration, b = 0.10, t51 = 0.70, p = 0.49, or objective accuracy,
b = 0.14, t51 = 1.01, p = 0.32 (see Figure 5B). As expected,
metacognitive judgment calibration was again related to objective
accuracy, b = 0.53, t50 =  4.48, p= 0.001.
Does objective accuracy explain the effect of information format
and numeracy on metacognitive judgment calibration? Visual aids
improve metacognitive judgment calibration in patients with
low numeracy after objective accuracy has been controlled for
statistically (see Figure 4). The ANCOVA with information
format and numeracy as between-subjects factors, metacognitive
judgment calibration across the three tasks as the dependent
variable, and objective accuracy as a covariate revealed a main
effect of objective accuracy, F1;103 = 37.25, p = 0.001, !2p = 0.27,
and information format, F1;103 = 5.56, p = 0.020, !2p = 0.05,
and an interaction between information format and numeracy,
F1;103 = 6.24, p = 0.014, !2p = 0.06.
As expected, in the numerical condition, regression analyses
showed that objective accuracy was related to metacognitive
judgment calibration, b =  0.46, t52 =  4.04, p = 0.001 (see
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FIGURE 4 | Objective accuracy across the three diagnostic tasks by
information format and numeracy after controlling for the effect of
metacognitive judgment calibration. Metacognitive judgment calibration
across the three diagnostic tasks by information format and numeracy after
controlling for the effect of objective accuracy. Error bars indicate one standard
error of the mean.
Figure 5C). Patients who made more accurate inferences also
more accurately assessed the accuracy of these inferences. When
objective accuracy was included in the regression analyses, the
effect of numeracy on metacognitive judgment calibration was
reduced but it was still significant, b =  0.35, t52 =  3.12,
p = 0.003. The results of the Sobel test indicated that objective
accuracy mediates the relationship between numeracy and
metacognitive judgment calibration, z =  2.78, p = 0.003.
However, the size of the indirect effect [Effect =  0.21, 95%
CI ( 0.24,  0.18)] was smaller and AIC (AIC = 1057.30) was
larger to that of the previous model. These results suggest that the
model including objective accuracy as amediator is a worsemodel
than the model including metacognitive judgment calibration as
a mediator.
In line with previous results, when patients received the
additional visual aid representing the numerical information,
objective accuracy was related to metacognitive judgment
calibration, b =  0.54, t50 =  4.48, p = 0.001 (see Figure 5D).
In sum, results in ANCOVAs and mediational analyses suggest
that metacognitive judgment calibration mediates the effect of
numeracy on objective accuracy (H3) and not the other way
around. Thus these analyses suggest that, in the numerical
condition, highly numerate patients make more accurate
inferences than patients with low numeracy because they more
accurately evaluate the accuracy of their own inferences. In
contrast, in the visual condition, patients at all levels of numeracy
showed similar high-levels of metacognitive judgment calibration
and, in turn, high-levels of inferential accuracy.
Discussion
We investigated patients’ diagnostic inferences about the
predictive value of medical tests from information about
the sensitivity and false-positive rate of the tests and the
prevalence of several diseases. Our results showed that
many patients—especially those with low numeracy—made
incorrect inferences about the predictive value of the tests and
dramatically overestimated the accuracy of these inferences. High
overestimates at low levels of accuracy become more calibrated at
higher levels of accuracy—a result that suggests the presence of an
“unskilled and unaware effect” (see also Ehrlinger and Dunning,
2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Ghazal et al., 2014).
Our results are compatible with previous evidence on the role of
numeracy in understanding health-relevant risk communications
and medical decision making (Fagerlin et al., 2007; Apter et al.,
2008; Reyna et al., 2009; Peters, 2012; Garcia-Retamero and
Galesic, 2013; Johnson and Tubau, 2015). Patients with low levels
of numeracy havemore difficulties interpreting numerical risks of
side effects (Gardner et al., 2011), and they are more susceptible
to being influenced by the way the health information is framed
in problems involving probabilities (Peters et al., 2006; Peters
and Levin, 2008; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2010a, 2011;
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero, 2011a)—presumably because they
are more influenced by non-numerical information (e.g., mood
states; Peters et al., 2007; Petrova et al., 2014). Compared to
patients with high numeracy, less-numerate patients also tend to
overestimate their risk of suffering from several diseases (Davids
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FIGURE 5 | Path analyses. Effect of numeracy on objective accuracy and the
mediational effect of metacognitive judgment calibration when (A) patients
received information only in numbers and when (B) they received an additional
visual display representing the numerical information. Effect of numeracy on
metacognitive judgment calibration and the mediational effect of objective
accuracy when (C) patients received information only in numbers and when (D)
they received an additional visual display representing the numerical information.
Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *p < 0.05.
et al., 2004; Gurmankin et al., 2004), they are less able to use
risk reduction information to adjust their risk estimates (e.g.,
screening data; Schwartz et al., 1997), they tend to overestimate
benefits of uncertain treatments (Weinfurt et al., 2003; Garcia-
Retamero and Galesic, 2010b), and they have more deficits
in understanding the information necessary to follow dietary
recommendations (Rothman et al., 2006). Compared to patients
with high numeracy, less-numerate patients also tend to search
for less information about their disease (Portnoy et al., 2010),
and they often choose lower-quality health options (e.g., health
insurance plans; Hibbard et al., 2007; Hanoch et al., 2010). As
a consequence, they tend to suffer more comorbidity and take
more prescribed drugs (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2015). Less-
numerate doctors and patients also favor a paternalistic model
of medical decision making, in which doctors are dominant and
autonomous (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2014), and patients prefer
not to participate and instead delegate decision making (Galesic
and Garcia-Retamero, 2011b). This is troubling given that the
paternalistic model of medical decision making is increasingly
being questioned (Kaplan and Frosch, 2005).
Our research suggests a potential explanation of the link
between numeracy and understanding of health-relevant
quantitative information. Highly numerate patients might make
more accurate inferences as compared to patients with low
numeracy because they more accurately evaluate the accuracy
of their own inferences (i.e., they show better metacognitive
judgment calibration). Thus metacognitive judgment calibration
might drive, at least in part, the numeracy-to-performance
relationship. Previous research suggests that the link between
numeracy and superior judgment and decision making might
reflect differences in heuristic-based deliberation (e.g., deep
elaborative processing; Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Cokely et al.,
2012), affective numerical intuition (e.g., precise symbolic number
mapping; Peters et al., 2006; Peters, 2012), and meaningful
intuitive understanding (e.g., gist-based representation and
reasoning; Reyna, 2004; Reyna et al., 2009; see Cokely et al., 2014,
for a review). Our research extends this literature suggesting
that there is also a tight link between numeracy, metacognition,
and understanding of health-relevant numerical information
(see Ghazal et al., 2014, for similar results in highly educated
samples).
Our results are also compatible with a variety of studies
indicating that judgment self-assessment can operate as a domain-
general skill that correlates with—but that can also be seen
as an independent predictor of—general abilities, personality
traits, and cognitive performance (Stankov, 2000; Stankov and
Lee, 2008; Schraw, 2010). Overall our results accord with
metacognitive theory suggesting that metacognitive judgment
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calibration tends to be useful because it is instrumental in
self-regulation—i.e., the monitoring and control of cognition
(Nelson, 1990; Metcalfe and Finn, 2008). Related studies of
factors like “feeling of correctness” show that confidence-
type judgments predict differences in information search and
elaboration. In addition to predicting judgments about the
correctness of one’s answer, one’s feeling of correctness tends
to be related to “rethinking” times and the likelihood of
changing one’s initial answer during reasoning (Thompson
et al., 2011). These studies suggest that factors related to
how one uses and assesses judgment accuracy may often be
essential components determining the extent to which one
deliberates during judgment and decision making (Ghazal
et al., 2014). For these and other reasons it seems likely
that metacognition is an essential component of the ability to
understand and make good decisions about risk (i.e., risk literacy;
see www.RiskLiteracy.org).
Finally, our results can have important implications for medical
practice as they suggest suitable ways to communicate quantitative
medical data—especially to patients lacking numerical skills.
Our research shows that visual aids improve both objective
accuracy and metacognitive judgment calibration, especially
in less numerate patients, eliminating differences between
this group of patients and the more numerate group. In
addition, our research suggests that visual aids increase objective
accuracy by improving metacognitive judgment calibration. As
we mentioned above, calibration can mediate the relationship
between numeracy and superior performance. In the current
research, however, this result only holds when patients received
numerical information without a visual display. In contrast,
metacognitive judgment calibration did not mediate the effect
of numeracy on objective accuracy when patients received the
additional visual aid representing the numerical information
because numeracy was no longer as robustly related to accuracy
of inferences. In the visual condition, both patients with low
and high numeracy were often well calibrated and, in turn, often
made accurate inferences. These results suggest that visual aids
might improve risk understanding, at least in part, by improving
metacognitive judgment calibration and reducing overestimates
of accuracy.
It is also possible that the effect of visual aids on both judgment
accuracy and metacognitive judgment calibration follow from
the development of better cognitive representations, which, in
turn, facilitate reasoning and metacognitive monitoring (see
Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Brase et al., 1998; Brase, 2009).
For instance, more cues available in memory can be used to
explore essential relationships or to recognize that one has
some missing knowledge. This conclusion is compatible with
previous research indicating that visual aids help less numerate
people identify and infer essential aspects of the risk information
(e.g., “gross-level information”; Feldman-Stewart et al., 2000;
Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2010). Visual aids also increase the ability
of less numerate people to recognize superordinate classes,
making part-to-whole relations in the data visually available
(Ancker et al., 2006; Reyna and Brainerd, 2008). Moreover, visual
aids improve risk comprehension by increasing the likelihood
that less numerate people deliberate on the available risk
information (Garcia-Retamero and Cokely, 2013, 2014b). By
influencing memory encoding and representation, visual aids can
also give rise to enduring changes in attitudes and behavioral
intentions, which in turn affect behavior and risky decision
making (Garcia-Retamero and Cokely, 2011, 2014a, 2015). Thus
visual aids can improve judgment and decision making and help
promote healthy behavior by improving understanding of health-
relevant numerical information, by improving assessments of the
accuracy of inferences about this information, and by establishing
enduring attitudes and fostering intentions to perform the
behavior, which may further promote understanding and self-
assessment.
As with any research, our study has some limitations and leaves
open several questions for future research. For instance, objective
accuracy and metacognitive judgment calibration were correlated
as the former was included in themeasurement of the latter. To the
extent that judgment calibration cannot be defined independently
of objective accuracy, these concepts are not independent. So
any results in this area need to be benchmarked accordingly.
Nevertheless, our analyses showed that information format and
numeracy have a significant effect on metacognitive judgment
calibration even after objective accuracy has been controlled for
statistically.
It is important to mention that our conclusions are based
on patients’ diagnostic inferences and estimates when they
received information about prevalence of several diseases,
and the sensitivity and false-positive rate of the tests in
natural frequencies (Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998; Hoffrage
et al., 2000, 2002). Future research could investigate these
inferences and estimates when the information is reported
in other numerical formats (e.g., probabilities). In addition,
future research could also investigate whether these inferences
and estimates affect behavioral intentions and actual behavior
(e.g., whether patients indicate that they would take a medical
test depending on the way the information about the test is
communicated and if expressed interest exceeds actual uptake).
Our sample of patients was older and less educated than
the general population in Spain and other countries. Future
research could also examine whether visual aids confer similar
results in more educated participants (e.g., physicians) in
different countries. Finally, future research could investigate
whether the general findings hold across different types of
visual aids (e.g., icon arrays, bar charts, and line plots), when
visual aids are provided instead of rather than in addition to
numerical information, and when visual aids differ in iconicity
(i.e., when they are more or less abstract). In accord with
the growing body of research, we predict that simple, well-
designed visual aids will show substantial benefits in many
situations, especially when communicating with less numerate
individuals.
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